Plaintiff wins Reversal against Deutsche , Barclays for Fraud et al.

Congrats to Lenore Albert and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for the
reversal and remand in the wrongful foreclosure of Helen Galope's home.
Lenore Albert successfully pled violations of the Unfair Competition laws,
breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing and fraud.

See the decision at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2014/03/27/12-56892.pdf.



HELEN GALOPE, an individual,
 Plaintiff - Appellant,
 v.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
COMPANY, as Trustee under Pooling and
Servicing Agreement dated as of May 1,
2007 Securitized Asset Backed
Receivables LLC Trust 2007-BR4; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2014/03/27/12-56892.pdf.

 Galope adequately alleged that she would not have purchased her loan had
she known that  the Defendants were manipulating the LIBOR rate. Article III standing exists
when a plaintiff purchases a product she would not have otherwise purchased but
for the alleged misconduct of the defendant. Hinojos v. Kohl's Corp., 718 F.3d
1098, 1104 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d
581, 595 (9th Cir. 2012)); Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir.
2011). Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, Galope’s standing does not turn on
whether she actually made interest payments that were adjusted in response to the
allegedly manipulated LIBOR rate. Galope’s cognizable injury occurred when she

purchased the loan, not upon payment of LIBOR-affected interest.1 Maya, 658

F.3d at 1069. 

1. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings on Galope’s

LIBOR claims against the Barclays Defendants under the Sherman Antitrust Act,

15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2, and her state law claims for breach of the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing, and fraud

2. We reverse the district court’s ruling that Galope lacks statutory standing to

pursue her LIBOR-based Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 17200, and False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §

17500, claims against the Barclays Defendants and remand for further proceedings. 

4. We reverse the district court’s rulings that Galope’s wrongful foreclosure

and UCL claims based on the DBNTC Defendants’ violation of the bankruptcy

court’s automatic stay are not justiciable. Although rescission of the sale—almost

seven months after the violation—mooted Galope’s claims for injunctive and

declaratory relief, it did not affect her claim for damages. See Wilson v. State of

Nev., 666 F.2d 378, 380-81 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, regardless of whether Galope

has equity in the home, 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) provides a statutory basis for

damages.

5. We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Galope’s

claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing associated with

violation of the automatic stay. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing “finds

particular application in situations where one party is invested with a discretionary

power affecting the rights of another.” Hicks v. E.T. Legg & Associates, 108 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 10, 19 (Ct. App. 2001). Discretionary power of this kind “must be

exercised in good faith.” Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev.

California, Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 726 (Cal. 1992). T