Monday, August 31, 2015

More Proof our Government is in Bed with the Banksters

In an article released yesterday in the New York Times,  reporter Gretchen Morgenson confirms another bank settlement with the S.E.C, but this one fails to name names.

 She notes " It is a deal that holds no one at the bank accountable for behavior that caused investors to lose an estimated $2 billion." Not surprisingly the fine is just a tiny bit of the estimated $2 Billion that clients were tricked out of when led to believe their investment in municipal bonds was safe, when in fact it was anything but safe.

"Citigroup will pay $180 million in the settlement, most of which will be distributed to wronged investors. The bank neither admitted nor denied the S.E.C.’s allegations. A spokesman said the bank was pleased to have resolved the matter."

Well worth the read, Ms Morgenson exposes other failures of our government to hold any of the players accountable, even when there is no doubt who is the mastermind of the criminal
behavior.

“He was absolutely the mastermind, there is no doubt about that.”

$180 Million is nothing to a giant like Citibank. Undoubtably the lawyers will receive more compensation that the wronged investors.


'Too Lame to Name' should be the new slogan for the S.E.C.

Too Lame to Name

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/business/sec-settlement-with-citigroup-holds-no-one-responsible.html?emc=edit_dlbkam_20150831&nl=business&nlid=68893896&_r=0


Monday, August 3, 2015

US BANK'S HOODWINKING NO LONGER FOOLING JUDGES

In an article written by Barry Fagan in JD SUPRA business advisor- he states that

" It has long been the successful strategy of banks to hoodwink judges into treating them as Holders in Due Course — even when HDC status is expressly denied by the foreclosing party. For them it is simple: they have the note in their possession and that is all anyone needs to know. That is dead wrong."


Many homeowners have lost their cases when the bank boldly lies to the courts about the chain of title and their right to foreclose.  However in St. Clair v US BANK  the court opines


"Ultimately the problem with US Bank’s attempt to establish standing to foreclose is that it relies on a “paper trail” that beats around the bush but never axes the tree necessary to establish the legal requirement of standing. We cannot, as advocated by U.S. Bank, presume standing simply because it serviced the loan; Long standing case law prevents us from doing so.”

This is what so many foreclosure fighters have been fighting for- hopefully the tide is turning.
See the July 17 2015 opinion here. 


http://www.2dca.org/opinions/Opinion_Pages/Opinion_Pages_2015/July/July%2017,%202015/2D14-2111.pdf








Friday, May 29, 2015

KY Appeals Court Upholds Whistleblower Verdict Against US Bancorp

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a verdict for Michael Rhinehimer who was fired for being a whistleblower. The Court affirmed that Rhinehimer was protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 

 Plaintiff filed his complaint in the instant action in 2011, alleging a single count of retaliation in violation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. The case was tried to a jury over five days in 2013. At trial, Plaintiff presented evidence that he was disciplined and fired in retaliation for an email he sent alerting one of his superiors to unsuitable trades made by a co-worker, Patrick Harrigan, to the detriment of Plaintiff’s elderly client, Norbert Purcell. The trades, which are undisputed, occurred while Plaintiff was on disability leave. Plaintiff learned of the trades from his personal assistant shortly after they were made. He called his immediate supervisor twice to express concern about the trades, and finally wrote an email to his supervising principal, criticizing the trades for “destroy[ing]” Purcell’s estate plan and asserting that the trades should never have been placed or approved. Upon returning, Plaintiff was specifically reprimanded for his email. His superiors also threatened his job, placed him on an aggressive “performance improvement plan,” and fired him when he ultimately failed to meet the plan goals.
The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff and awarded damages for economic loss and emotional damages. Via special verdict form, the jury specifically found (1)  that Plaintiff “proved by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the complaint, he had an objectively reasonable belief that Mr. Harrigan had committed unsuitability fraud;” (2) that Plaintiff “further proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [Plaintiff’s] email was a contributing factor in his termination;” and (3) that Defendant did not prove “by clear and convincing evidence that it would have discharged [Plaintiff] even if he had not sent the email.” (R. 114, Special Verdict Form, PGID 3850-51.)



The information that was available to Plaintiff was more than adequate to allow him reasonably to believe that the trades were the result of conduct constituting unsuitability fraud. When USBII retaliated against him for reporting that information, it therefore violated Sarbanes–Oxley’s whistleblower protections.

CONCLUSION


For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2804082/michael-rhinehimer-v-us-bancorp-investments-inc/?q=rhinehimer&type=o&stat_Precedential=on&order_by=score+deschttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2804082/michael-rhinehimer-v-us-bancorp-investments-inc/?q=rhinehimer&type=o&stat_Precedential=on&order_by=score+desc

Monday, May 18, 2015

OPINION Mcculley v US BANK Released for Publication






SYNOPSIS OF THE CASE
2015 MT 100, DA 14-0267: Mary McCulley, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant v. U.S. Bank , Defendant, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.1

        Mary McCulley bought a condominium in Bozeman and sought a 30-year, residential loan for $300,000 from Heritage Bank, which later merged with U.S. Bank. She later sued the Bank, alleging the Bank defrauded her by instead issuing an 18-month, $300,000 commercial loan, and failing to notify her of the change. When McCulley could not obtain refinancing and the condominium went into foreclosure, she attempted suicide. The jury found that the Bank defrauded McCulley and awarded her $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages, which the District Court approved.

           On appeal, U.S. Bank argued that testimony it had offered from a former bank officer and McCulley’s medical records were improperly excluded from evidence; challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding of fraud; argued that U.S. Bank could not be held liable for punitive damages arising out of Heritage Bank’s conduct that preceded the merger of the banks; and challenged the propriety of the punitive damages award. McCulley cross-appealed the date set by the District Court for interest to begin accruing on the judgment.

         The Montana Supreme Court concluded that, because U.S. Bank had failed to provide the bank officer’s journals to McCulley during the discovery process, the officer was prohibited from testifying with respect to the journals. The Court further concluded that because U.S. Bank failed to lay a proper evidentiary foundation for McCulley’s medical records, they were properly excluded. The Court held that fraud was demonstrated because evidence at trial established that the Bank falsely represented it would provide a 30-year, residential loan to McCulley, the Bank knew the representation was false, and the Bank intended McCulley to rely on the false representation, which she did to her detriment. The Court also held that, because the federal Bank Merger Act required U.S. Bank to assume “all liabilities” of Heritage Bank, U.S. Bank was properly held liable for all damages, including punitive damages, arising out of Heritage Bank’s conduct, and that circumstances proven during the trial supported the punitive damages award because the Bank’s conduct was reprehensible, the ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages fell within the guidelines provided by the United States Supreme Court, and the statutory cap on punitive damages provided by the Montana Legislature was not exceeded. Lastly, the  Court concluded that interest on the judgment must accrue from the date of the jury’s verdict, not the date of District Court’s post-trial decision approving the award. Thus, the Court affirmed the damages judgment, and reversed the calculation of interest on the judgment.


1 This synopsis has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It constitutes no part of the Opinion of the Court and may not be cited as precedent.